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1. Introduction
In [22], Hugo Herbelin showed that, by extending the proof-term calculus of intu-
itionistic predicate logic with a restricted form of delimited control operators, one can
obtain a logical system able to derive a predicate-logic version of Markov’s Principle,
¬¬∃xA(x) ⇒ ∃xA(x) (for A(x) a {⇒,∀}-free formula), while remaining essentially
intuitionistic – satisfying the disjunction and existence properties.
Separately, [21] he also observed that using the full power of delimited control op-
erators one can derive the predicate-logic version of the Double-negation Shift schema,
∀x¬¬A(x) ⇒ ¬¬∀xA(x) (where A(x) is arbitrary), and posed the question whether
there is a corresponding logical system which also posseses the disjunction and exis-
tence properties. With this article, we answer Herbelin’s question in the affirmative.
Delimited control operators have appeared in Theoretical Computer Science, in Se-
mantics of Programming Languages, as a powerful abstraction to account for so-called
computational effects. While being pervasive in the practise of writing computer pro-
grams (for, they include facilities as basic as reading from and writing into memory,
stopping the execution of the program, or parallel computation), giving a good mathe-
matical explanation of effects is still one of the major research topics in Semantics.
An important step in that direction was a result of Filinski [13, 14], who showed
that every monadic computational effect can be operationally simulated by the delim-
ited control operators shift/reset, introduced previously by himself and Danvy [9, 10].
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However, the logical status of shift/reset themselves, and other such operators in gen-
eral, remains to be fully established, something we hope to being contributing to with
this article.
Another interest in delimited control operators, and actually our original interest in
them, comes from the role they promise to be playing in a future constructive proof of
completeness of full intuitionistic logic (with ∨ and ∃) with respect to Kripke seman-
tics, something described in [25, 24].
We illustrate the utility of delimited control operators, by considering some exam-
ples in a λ-calculus extended with them, containing also natural numbers with the plus
operation. The extension consists of two constructs, a delimiter (# – “reset”) and a
control operator (S – “shift”). The delimiter is used as a special kind of brackets in a
λ-term, so that the control operator, which can only appear inside such “brackets”, be
able to gain control of its surrounding context, up to the delimiter. For example, in the
following λ-term reduction,
1 + #2 + Sk.4 → 1 + #4 { (λa.#2 + a)/ k} = 1 + #4 → 1 + 4 → 5,
reset is used to delimit the sub-term 2 + Sk.4. Shift then behaves as a binder, alike
λ-abstraction, that names the abstracted surroundings of shift, 2+, by k, and replaces
in its sub-expression, 4, all occurrences of k by the abstracted surroundings. In this
case, k is not used inside shift – this corresponds to the so-called “exceptions” effect
that Herbelin found out to be the computational contents behind Markov’s Principle.
In the next example, k is used; the sub-term inside shift uses its surrounding context
twice:
1 + #2 + Sk.k4 + k8
→1 + #(λa.#2 + a)4 + (λa.#2 + a)8
→+1 + #(#6) + (#10)
→+1 + #6 + 10
→+17
From the logical perspective, considering natural deduction formalisms which can
be isomorphically presented by proof-λ-terms, we see delimited control, when added
to the syntax of such proof terms, as a means of being able to access a certain part
of the surroundings of a proof term from inside the proof term itself.2 The part of the
surrounding that we want to be able to access will be defined as a “pure evaluation
context” in Section 2; logically, it is the surroundings of a proof term for a {⇒,∀}-
free formula,3 which is the predicate logic equivalent of arithmetic Σ01-formulae, for
2This is to be contrasted to what happens with the (undelimited) control operator call/cc, which is better
known in Logic for its role in the development of classical realisability [20, 31, 32, 33] – call/cc amounts
computationally to aborting the entire computation and, since its effect is not delimited, one has no hope of
getting a natural computational interpretation from classical realisability: a realiser of an existential statement
needs not be a program which computes a witness for the existential quantifier.
3Following Berger [8], we call the {⇒,∀}-free formulae, Σ-formulae, and denote them by S , T,U , while
general formulae are denoted by A, B,C.
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which we know that classical and intuitionistic provability coincide. In other words,
we propose a proof-term calculus for a logic which is essentially intuitionistic, except
that at the fragment “Σ01” we are allowed to use classical reasoning to obtain more
(succinct) proofs.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next Section 2, we introduce our system
MQC+. The acronym comes from Troelstra: IQC is intuitionistic predicate logic, MQC
is minimal predicate logic (IQC without the ⊥E rule), and CQC is classical predicate
logic. In Section 3, we characterise the relationship between MQC+, MQC, and CQC;
in particular, we show that an extension to predicate logic of Glivenko’s Theorem holds
for our system, unlike for MQC. In Section 4, we prove properties of the reduction
relation on proof terms, from which we obtain the Disjunction and Existence Property
for closed derivations of MQC+. In the final Section 5, we discuss related and future
work.
2. The system MQC+
The natural deduction system of MQC+ is shown in Table 1. It consists of the proof
rules of minimal intuitionistic predicate logic MQC, plus two new ones, “shift” (S) and
“reset” (#).
The turnstile symbol “`” can carry an annotation – a Σ-formula T – which is neither
used nor changed by the intuitionistic rules. We use the wild-card symbol  for this
purpose, to mean that there either is an annotating formula T , or that there is none. In
the proof rules where the wild-card appears both above and below the line, it means that
either there is the same annotation both above and below, or that there is no annotation
above and no annotation below.
The rule (#) can only be applied when the conclusion is a Σ-formula T . It acts as a
delimiter in the proof tree, (re-)initialising the annotation with the formula T ; from that
point upwards in the tree, classical reasoning is allowed – but, only so because we are
ultimately proving a Σ-formula. The rule (S) can then be used, inside a sub-tree with
(#) at its root, as a kind of (¬¬E) rule. Its role is to “escape” to the nearest enclosing
delimiter once a witness for the Σ-formula from the annotation has been found.
However, note that, although there can be arbitrarily many uses of the (#) and (S)
rules in a derivation tree, only one formula T is allowed to appear in annotations, glob-
ally, of a derivation tree. This means that the global T is set once and for all, hence it
is not possible to mix derivations using different T and T ′. Were we in IQC, a natural
choice for the global T would have been ⊥.
As examples, we give the derivations for (generalisations of) the minimal-predicate-
logic versions4 of Markov’s Principle,
(T ⇒ S ) ⇒ ((S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ⇒ S , (MPT )
and Double-negation Shift,
∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ⇒ (∀xA(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T, (DNST )
4The distinguished formula T plays the role of ⊥ and the hypothesis T ⇒ S plays the role of the ⊥E rule.
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A ∈ Γ Ax
Γ ` A
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2
∧I
Γ ` A1 ∧ A2
Γ ` A1 ∧ A2
∧iEΓ ` Ai
Γ ` Ai
∨iIΓ ` A1 ∨ A2
Γ ` A1 ∨ A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C
∨E
Γ ` C
Γ, A1 ` A2 ⇒I
Γ ` A1 ⇒ A2
Γ ` A1 ⇒ A2 Γ ` A1 ⇒E
Γ ` A2
Γ ` A(x) x-fresh
∀I
Γ ` ∀xA(x)
Γ ` ∀xA(x)
∀E
Γ ` A(t)
Γ ` A(t)
∃I
Γ ` ∃x.A(x)
Γ ` ∃x.A(x) Γ, A(x) ` C x-fresh
∃E
Γ ` C
Γ `T T # (“reset”)
Γ ` T
Γ, A ⇒ T `T T
S (“shift”)
Γ `T A
Table 1: Natural deduction system of MQC+
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where, according to the already set convention, T and S are Σ-formulae, while A(x) is
a general one.
Ax
· · · `S T ⇒ S
Ax
· · · `S (S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T
Ax
· · · , S `S S
S
· · · , S `S T
⇒I
· · · `S S ⇒ T
⇒E
· · · `S T
⇒ET ⇒ S , (S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T `S S #T ⇒ S , (S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ` S
⇒IT ⇒ S ` ((S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ⇒ S
⇒I
` (T ⇒ S ) ⇒ ((S ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ⇒ S
Ax
· · · ` ∀xA(x) ⇒ T
...
∀E ,⇒E , Ax
· · · ,∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) , A(x) ⇒ T `T T
S
· · · ,∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) `T A(x)
∀I , x-fresh
· · · ,∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) `T ∀xA(x)
⇒E
∀xA(x) ⇒ T,∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) `T T #
∀xA(x) ⇒ T,∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ` T
⇒I
∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ` (∀xA(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T
⇒I
` ∀x ((A(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) ⇒ (∀xA(x) ⇒ T ) ⇒ T
We now define a calculus of proof-term annotations for the natural deduction sys-
tem of MQC+, a version of simply typed λ-calculus with constants for handling all
logical connectives and the delimited control operators, and then a reduction system
for proof terms; the idea is that reducing a proof term describes the process of normal-
ising a natural deduction derivation.
The definitions are based on standard treatments of Logic as λ-calculus (see, for
example, [41]), and standard treatment of λ-calculus with shift/reset from Semantics of
Programming Languages (for example, [2]).
2.1 Definition. The set of proof terms is defined by the following inductive definition,
p, q ::= a | ι1 p | ι2 p | case p of (a1.q1‖a2.q2) | (p, q) | pi1 p | pi2 p | λa.p | pq |
λx.p | pt | (t, p) | dest p as (x.a) in q | #p | Sk.p
where a, b, k, l denote hypothesis variables, x, y, z denote quantifier variables, and t, u, v
denote quantifier terms (individuals); hence, λa.p is a constructor for implication, while
λx.p is a constructor for universal quantification; (p, q) is a constructor for conjunction
while (t, p) is a constructor for existential quantification, and pq is a destructor for
implication while pt is a destructor for universal quantification.
2.2 Remark. The S in Sk.p is a binder, it binds k in p just as λ binds a in q in a lambda
abstraction λa.q. Following standard terminology, we sometimes call k a continuation
variable.
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(a : A) ∈ Γ
Ax
Γ ` a : A
Γ ` p : A1 Γ ` q : A2
∧I
Γ ` (p, q) : A1 ∧ A2
Γ ` p : A1 ∧ A2
∧iEΓ ` pii p : Ai
Γ ` p : Ai
∨iIΓ ` ιi p : A1 ∨ A2
Γ ` p : A1 ∨ A2 Γ, a1 : A1 ` q1 : C Γ, a2 : A2 ` q2 : C
∨E
Γ ` case p of (a1.q1‖a2.q2) : C
Γ, a : A1 ` p : A2
⇒I
Γ ` λa.p : A1 ⇒ A2
Γ ` p : A1 ⇒ A2 Γ ` q : A1
⇒E
Γ ` pq : A2
Γ ` p : A(x) x-fresh
∀I
Γ ` λx.p : ∀xA(x)
Γ ` p : ∀xA(x)
∀E
Γ ` pt : A(t)
Γ ` p : A(t)
∃I
Γ ` (t, p) : ∃x.A(x)
Γ ` p : ∃x.A(x) Γ, a : A(x) ` q : C x-fresh
∃E
Γ ` dest p as (x.a) in q : C
Γ `T p : T # (“reset”)
Γ ` #p : T
Γ, k : A ⇒ T `T p : T
S (“shift”)
Γ `T Sk.p : A
Table 2: Proof term annotation for the natural deduction system of MQC+
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2.3 Definition. The subset of proof terms known as values is defined by:
V ::= a | ι1V | ι2V | (V,V) | (t,V) | λa.p | λx.p
2.4 Definition. The set of pure evaluation contexts, a subset of all proof terms with
one placeholder or “hole”, is defined by:
P ::= [ ] | case P of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) | pi1P | pi2P | dest P as (x.a) in p |
Pq | (λa.q)P | Pt | ι1P | ι2P | (P, p) | (V, P) | (t, P)
The association of proof terms to natural deduction derivations is given in Table 2.
P[p] denotes the proof term obtained from P by replacing its placeholder [ ] with the
proof term p.
In order to define a reduction relation on proof terms we also need the notion of
(non-pure) evaluation context.
2.5 Definition. The set of evaluation contexts is given by the following inductive defi-
nition:
E ::= [ ] | case E of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) | pi1E | pi2E | dest E as (x.a) in p |
Eq | (λa.q)E | Et | ι1E | ι2E | (E, p) | (V, E) | (t, E) | #E
The set of evaluation contexts is larger than the set of pure evaluation contexts,
because it includes #. As before, E[p] denotes the proof term obtained from E by
replacing its placeholder [ ] with the proof term p.
2.6 Definition. The reduction relation on proof terms “→” is defined by the following
rewrite rules:
(λa.p)V → p{V/a} case ιiV of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) → pi{V/ai}
(λx.p)t → p{t/x} dest (t,V) as (x.a) in p → p{t/x}{V/a}
pii(V1,V2) → Vi #P[Sk.p] → #p {(λa.#P[a]) /k}
#V → V E[p] → E[p′] when p → p′
The last rule is known as the “congruent closure” of the preceding rules. The rule for S
applies only when the evaluation context P is pure. The reduction strategy determined
by the rules is standard call-by-value reduction. [40]
2.7 Example. The following are the proof terms corresponding to the derivation trees
for MPT and DNST from page 3.
λe.λa.#e(a(λb.Sk.b))
λa.λb.#b(λx.Sk.axk)
Remark that the proof term for MPT does not make use of the continuation variable k,
but only uses the S operator to pass the value b, once it has been found in the course of
the computation, back to the control delimiter #.
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3. Relationship to MQC and CQC
To connect provability in MQC+with provability in MQC and CQC, we use the
following double-negation translation.
3.1 Definition. The superscript translation AT of a formula A with respect to a Σ-
formula T is defined via the subscript translation AT , which is in turn defined by recur-
sion on the structure of A:
AT :=(AT ⇒ T ) ⇒ T
AT :=A if A is atomic
(AB)T :=ATBT for = ∨,∧
(A ⇒ B)T :=AT ⇒ BT
(∃A)T :=∃AT
(∀A)T :=∀AT
We write ΓT for the translation (−)T applied to each formula of the context Γ individu-
ally.
This translation is the standard call-by-value CPS translation of types [40], and
is similar to the Kuroda translation [44], the difference being that we add a double
negation, not only after ∀, but also after ⇒. Interestingly, when interpreting, using
DNS, the negative translation of the Axiom of Countable Choice AC0, a transformation
from the Kuroda translation of AC0 into our form, with ¬¬ after ⇒, appears to be
needed [27, p. 200]. Also, Avigad has remarked in [4] that the Kuroda translation
makes essential use of the ⊥E rule.
3.2 Remark. When A is a Σ-formula, we have that AT = A.
We will denote derivability in MQC+ by “`+”, derivability in MQC by “`m”, and the
one in CQC by “`c”. When we say CQC, we have in mind a standard natural deduction
calculus, but where ⊥ is replaced by a distinguished formula T – which one, will be
clear from context – and correspondingly, the ⊥E rule says that T ⇒ A, and the ¬¬E
rule is (A ⇒ T ) ⇒ T `c A. The following theorem is not surprising, since, after all, our
system is a subsystem of classical logic, but we give it for the sake of completeness,
since this version of Kuroda’s translation does not use the ⊥E rule in the target system.
3.3 Theorem (Equiconsistency with MQC). Given a derivation of Γ `+ A, which uses
S and # for the Σ-formula T , we can build a derivation of ΓT `m AT .
Proof. By induction on the derivation, using the proof terms listed below. A line above
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a sub-term marks the place where the induction hypothesis is applied.
a = λk.ka
λa.p = λk.k (λa.λk′.p (λb.k′b))
pq = λk.p (λ f .q (λa. f a (λb.kb)))
(p, q) = λk.p (λa.q (λb.k (a, b)))
pi1 p = λk.p (λc.k (pi1c))
ι1 p = λk.p (λa.k (ι1a))
case p of (a1.q1‖a2.q2) = λk.p (λc. case c of (a1.q1k‖a2.q2k))
λx.p = λk.k (λx.λk′.p (λb.k′b))
pt = λk.p (λ f . f tk)
(t, p) = λk.p (λa.k(t, a))
dest p as (x.a) in q = λk.p (λc. dest c as (x.a) in qk)
#ap = λk.k (p(λa.a))
Sl.p = λk. (p(λa.a)) {λa.λk′.k′ (ka)/ l}
In order to relate MQC+-provability of certain forms of formulae to their provabil-
ity in MQC and CQC, we need the following version of the DNS schema, which is
extended with a clause handling implication, something that is not needed when one
has the ⊥E rule. We denote by ¬T A the formula A ⇒ T ; when it is clear from the
context, we omit the subscript T from ¬T .
3.4 Definition. The Double Negation Shift for T (DNST ) is the following generalisa-
tion of the minimal-predicate-logic version of the usual DNS schema, extended with a
clause handling implication:
∀x.¬T¬T A(x) ⇒ ¬T¬T (∀x.A(x)) (DNS∀T )
(A ⇒ ¬T¬T B) ⇒ ¬T¬T (A ⇒ B) (DNS⇒T )
The following proposition is given for IQC as Exercise 2.3.3 of [44], we give the
proof here to emphasise the role of DNS⇒T when ⊥E is not present.
3.5 Proposition. DNST `m ¬T¬T A ⇔ AT .
Proof. Induction on the complexity of A. When A is atomic, AT = ¬¬A.
(∧) Both directions are via the proof term
λc.λk.IHA
(
λk′.c (λd.k′ (pi1d)))
(
λa.IHB
(
λk′.c (λd.k′ (pi2d))) (λb.k (a, b))) .
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(∨) Both directions are via the proof term
λa.λk.a (λc.
case c of (a1.IHA (λl.la1) (λb.k (ι1b)) ‖a2.IHB (λl.la2) (λb.k (ι2b))))
(∃) Analogous to case (∨).
(⇒) In this case it is crucial to use DNS⇒T , since in minimal logic we do not have ⊥E .
The direction left-to-right is via the proof term
λc.λk.IH←A
(
λk′.DNS⇒T
(
λa.λk′′.k′a) k)
(
λa.IH→B
(
λk′.c (λ f .k′ ( f a))) (λb.k (λa′.λk′.k′b))) .
The direction right-to-left is via the proof term
λc.λk.IH→A
(
λk′.DNS⇒T
(
λa.λk′′.k′a) k)
(
λa.IH←B
(
λk′.c (λ f . f ak′)) (λb.k (λa′.b))) .
The arrows in the superscript of “IH” determine the direction in which the in-
duction hypotheses are used.
(∀) We have:
(∀xA(x))T =¬¬(∀xAT (x)) IH↔ ¬¬(∀x¬¬A(x))
DNS∀T
↔ ¬¬¬¬∀xA(x) ↔ ¬¬∀xA(x)
3.6 Lemma. Γ `c A if and only if ΓT `m AT .
Proof. The direction right-to-left follows from the previous proposition, because DNS
is a classical theorem. The other direction is by induction on the derivation of Γ `c A.
Actually, we can use the translation table of the proof of Theorem 3.3 to treat all cases,
except for the ¬¬E rule which was not covered by the translation. We remark that
there is no need to translate the ⊥E rule, since it comes for free in classical logic – it is
derivable from the ¬¬E rule.
To show that ΓT `m AT follows from ΓT `m (¬¬A)T , we use the fact that `m
¬¬(TT ) ↔ T :
(¬¬A)T = ((A ⇒ T ) ⇒ T )T = ¬¬((AT ⇒ ¬¬T ) ⇒ ¬¬T )
⇔ ¬¬((AT ⇒ T ) ⇒ T ) = ¬¬¬¬AT ⇔ ¬¬AT = AT .
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We proved the following relationships for the provability of an arbitrary formula A
in MQC+, MQC, and CQC:
`+ A
3.3 // `m AT
3.5

oo 3.6 // `c A
`+ ¬¬A DNST `m ¬¬Aoo
3.7 Corollary. For any formula A, we have the following diagram:
`+ ¬¬A
3.3 // `m (¬¬A)T
3.5

oo 3.6 // `c A
DNST `m ¬¬A
OO
DNST `m ¬¬¬¬Aoo
In particular, the statement `+ ¬¬A ←→ `c A represents an extension of Glivenko’s
theorem [16, 45, 46] to predicate logic.
4. Properties
In this section we will prove that MQC+ has the Normalisation, Disjunction, and
Existence Properties, by proving properties of the reduction relation on proof terms.
4.1 Lemma (Annotation Weakening). If Γ ` p : A, then Γ `T p : A for any T .
Proof. A simple induction on the derivation.
4.2 Lemma (Substitutions). The following hold:
1. If Γ, a : A ` p : B and Γ ` q : A, then Γ ` p{q/a} : B.
2. If Γ ` p : B(x), where x is fresh, and t is a closed term, then Γ ` p{t/x} : B(t).
Proof. The proof is standard, by induction on the derivation (see for example [41]).
The new rules S and # pose no problems, since we can use the identities (#p){q/a} =
#(p{q/a}) and (Sk.p){q/a} = Sk.(p{q/a}) when k is fresh.
4.3 Lemma (Decomposition). If Γ `T P[Sk.p] : B, then there is a formula A and
derivations Γ, k : A ⇒ T `T p : T and Γ, a : A `T P[a] : B.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation. We only need to consider the
rules that can generate a pure evaluation context of the required form. Of the rules
that we consider, for the intuitionistic rules, the proof is simply by using the induction
hypothesis, as shown below for the ∧I rule; and the only non-intuitionistic rule to
consider is S, because # does not generate a pure evaluation context.
• For ∧I , there are two cases to consider, depending on whether the pure evaluation
context is (P[Sk.p], q) or (V, P[Sk.p]), but the proofs are analogous. Let the last
rule in the derivation be:
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Γ `T P[Sk.p] : B1 Γ `T q : B2
Γ `T (P[Sk.p], q) : B1 ∧ B2
The induction hypothesis gives us a formula A1 and two derivations, Γ, k : A1 ⇒
T `T p : T and Γ, a : A1 `T P[a] : B1, from which the goal follows by choosing
A := A1.
• For S, the pure evaluation context must be the empty one, so the last used rule
is:
Γ, k : B ⇒ T `T p : T
Γ `T [Sk.p] : B
If we set A := B, the goal follows from the premise of the rule above and, for
Γ, a : A `T [a] : A, from the Ax rule.
4.4 Lemma (Annotation Strengthening). Γ `S V : T −→ Γ ` V : T
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation and very simple. We only need to
consider the intuitionistic rules that introduce a value and that prove a Σ-formula, that
is, the rules Ax, ∧I , ∨1I , ∨
2
I , and ∃I . S and # do not introduce a value.
4.5 Theorem (Subject Reduction). If Γ ` p : A and p → q, then Γ ` q : A.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation and is standard (see for example
[41]), by using Substitutions Lemma 4.2 and Decomposition Lemma 4.3. Below, we
consider the new rules and, for illustration, one of the intuitionistic rules.
(#) We have Γ ` #p and #p → q for some q. We look at three possible cases,
because there are three rules for reducing a term of form #p. If q ≡ #q′ and
the reduction was by the congruence rule, we have p → q′; now use IH and
the # rule to finish the proof. If p is a value and q ≡ p, then Γ `T q : T ;
now use Strengthening Lemma 4.4 to conclude Γ ` q : T . The third case is
when p ≡ P[Sk.p′] and q ≡ #p′{(λa.#P[a])/k} – then, the proof is by combining
lemmas 4.2 and 4.3.
(S) This case is impossible, since there are no rules for reducing a term of form Sk.p
on its own, and the set of evaluation contexts does not include a clause for Sk.[ ].
(∧1E) We have Γ ` p : A ∧ B, Γ ` pi1 p : A, and pi1 p → q. If the reduction was by
the congruence rule, then q ≡ pi1q′ for some q′, and we can use IH. Otherwise,
p ≡ (V1,V2) and q ≡ V1, and Γ ` p : A ∧ B must have been proved by the ∧I
rule, which is enough.
While the last theorem shows that reducing a proof term does not change its logical
specification, the next one shows that a proof term which is not in normal form does
not get “stuck”.
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4.6 Theorem (Progress). If ` p : A, p is not a value, and p is not of form P[Sk.p′],
then p reduces in one step to some proof term r.
Proof. By induction on the derivation. The cases Ax, (⇒I), and (∀I) introduce a value,
while the case (S) introduces a Sk.p term, so they are impossible.
(∧I) We have that ` (p, q) : A ∧ B and (p, q) is neither a value nor of form P[Sk.p′].
From (p, q) , V , we have that at least one of p and q is not a value. From
(p, q) , P[Sk.p′], we have that p , P′[S k.r], and p , V ′ or q , P′[Sk.r].
If p is not a value, since it is neither of form P′[Sk.r], by IH, p → r for some r,
hence (p, q) → (r, q).
If p is a value V ′, then q is not a value and it is not of form P′[Sk.r], and, by IH,
q → r, therefore (V ′, q) → (V ′, r).
(∧1E) We have that ` pi1 p : A and that pi1 p, hence p itself, is not of form P[Sk.p′].
If p is a value, then it must be a pair (V1,V2), so pi1(V1,V2) → V1. If p is not a
value, we can use IH to obtain pi1 p → pi1r for some r.
(∨1I ) From ` ι1 p : A ∨ B and ι1 p a non-value and not of form P[Sk.p′], we have that
p is not a value and not of that form, so we use IH to obtain an r such that p → r,
hence ι1 p → ι1r.
(∨E) We have ` case p of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) : C. If p is a value, then it is of form ιiV ,
therefore case ιiV of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) → pi {V/ai}. If p is of form P[Sk.p′], then
so is case p of (a1.p1‖a2.p2). Otherwise, we use IH to obtain an r such that
case p of (a1.p1‖a2.p2) → case r of (a1.p1‖a2.p2).
(⇒E) From pq , P[Sk.r], we have that p , P′[Sk.r], and p , V ′ or q , P′[Sk.r].
If p is not a value, since it is also not of form P′[Sk.r], we can use IH.
If p is a value, it is of form λa.p′. If q is a value V , then pq → p′{V/a}. If q is
not a value, it can not be of form P′[Sk.r], because p is a value; then, we can use
IH on q.
(∀E) We have ` pt : A(t). If p is of form P[Sk.p′], then so is pt. If p is a value, then
it is of form λx.r, hence (λx.r)t → r{t/x}. Otherwise, by IH, p → r for some r,
so pt → rt.
(∃I) From ` (t, p) : A(t) and (t, p) a non-value and not of form P[Sk.p′], we have
that p is not a value and not of that form, so we use IH to obtain an r such that
(t, p) → (t, r).
(∃E) We have ` dest p as (x.a) in q : C. If p is a value, then it is of form (t,V),
therefore dest (t,V) as (x.a) in q → q {t/x} {V/a}. If p is of form P[Sk.p′],
then so is dest p as (x.a) in q. Otherwise, we use IH to obtain an r such that
dest p as (x.a) in q → dest r as (x.a) in q.
(#) We have ` #p : T . If p is a value, then #p → p. If p ≡ P[Sk.p′], then
#p → #p′{λa.#P[a]/k}. If p is neither a value nor of form P[Sk.p′], by IH,
p → p′, so #p → #p′.
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4.7 Corollary (Normalisation). For every closed proof term p0, such that ∅ `+ p0 : A,
there is a finite reduction path p0 → p1 → . . . → pn ending with a value pn.
Proof. This is a consequence of Subject Reduction and Progress, because a derivation
tree ∅ `+ p0 : A, with no annotations under the turnstile, can not reduce to the form
P[Sk.p]. That the reduction path has finite length follows from Theorem 4 of [2, 3].
4.8 Remark. When proving Normalisation of a variant of λ-calculus, it is customary to
distinguish weak (there exists a terminating reduction sequence) from strong normal-
isation (all reduction sequences terminate). There is no need to make that distinction
in the present case, because the reduction system is of the type known as weak head
reduction, which only permits one possible reduction sequence.
4.9 Corollary (Disjunction and Existence Properties). If ∅ `+ A ∨ B, then ∅ `+ A or
∅ `+ B. If ∅ `+ ∃xA(x), then there exists a closed term t such that ∅ `+ A(t).
Proof. Let ∅ `+ p : A ∨ B. By Normalisation and Subject Reduction, for some V ,
p → · · · → V and ∅ `+ V : A ∨ B. Since V is a value, V must be of form ι1V ′ or ι2V ′,
therefore either ∅ `+ V ′ : A or ∅ `+ V ′ : B. The case for “∃” is analogous.
5. Related and future work
5.1. Double-negation Shift
The first use of a schema equivalent to DNS appears to be in modal logic, by Barcan
[6, 5, 15], who introduced what is today known as Barcan’s formula,
∀xA(x) → ∀xA(x),
or, equivalently,
♦∃xA(x) → ∃♦A(x).
Veldman kindly pointed to us that DNS is also known as Kuroda’s Conjecture [34].
In [30], Kripke showed that Kuroda’s Conjecture and Markov’s Principle are underiv-
able in intuitionistic logic. (however, see also [28] for criticism of Kripke’s argument)
In [29, Section 2.11], Kreisel used the principle
¬∀nA(n) ⇒ ∃n¬A(n), (GMP)
for A(n) an arbitrary formula, to deal with implication while giving a translation of
formulae of Analysis into functionals of finite type. In [39], Oliva calls this principle
the Generalised Markov’s Principle (GMP) and remarks that HAω ` DNS ↔ ¬¬GMP.
Kreisel does not give a justification of GMP in his paper.
The term “double negation shift” appears for the first time in [42] to denote the
formula
∀n¬¬A(n) ⇒ ¬¬∀nA(n). (DNS)
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There, Spector builds upon previous works of Go¨del [17, 18, 19], namely he realises
DNS by adding the schema of bar recursion to Go¨del’s system T. The name “bar recur-
sion” comes from the Bar Principle of Brouwer which is used in justifying it. However,
Spector attaches no particular interest to the DNS schema itself; he writes:
The schema [DNS] is chosen not because we believe it is of intuitionistic
significance, but to provide a formal system in which classical analysis is
easily interpreted, and whose logical basis is intuitionistic. [42]
We treat DNS at the level of predicate logic, not of arithmetic, an important change
in status that we plan to investigate in future.
5.2. Negative translation of Countable Choice
The Axiom of Countable Choice,
∀x0∃yρA(x, y) ⇒ ∃ f 0→ρ∀x0A(x, f (x)), (AC0)
is a formula schema of HAω, Heyting Arithmetic in all finite types. The type 0 stands
for the set of natural numbers N, the type 1 = 0 → 0 stands for the functions N → N,
2 stands for the functionals (0 → 0) → 0, and so on; ρ is a type variable.
Spector showed that Kuroda’s [27, p.163] negative translation, ¬¬(AC0∗), of AC0,
∀x0¬¬∃yρA∗(x, y) ⇒ ∃ f 0→ρ∀x0¬¬A∗(x, f (x)), (ACN0 )
is provable from DNS and the intuitionistic AC0. Since AC0 is realisable in HAω,
and DNS is realisable by bar recursion, so is ACN0 . His approach was extended to the
Axiom of Dependent Choice (DC) by Luckhardt [36] and Howard [23]. In more recent
years, Kohlenbach, Berger, and Oliva have given their own versions of bar recursion
(see [7] for a comparison).
Since we treat DNS at the level of pure logic, without considering arithmetic ax-
ioms, we are only able to give an open proof term deriving the negative translation of
AC0,
∀x0¬T¬T∃yρAT (x, y) ⇒ ¬T¬T∃ f 0→ρ∀x0¬T¬T AT (x, f (x)). (AC0T )
Given a variable c to denote a proof of the intuitionistic AC0, we can use a proof
term similar to the one of DNST for deriving the above schema:
λa.λk.#k(c(λx.Sk′.ax(λd.k′(νd)))),
where ν is a proof term for ∃yAT (x, y) ⇒ ∃yAT (x, y).
The proof term being open means that we can not immediately use it for computa-
tion. We would have to either develop a realisability interpretation for MQC+, or add
delimited control operators to an intuitionistic system with strong existential quanti-
fiers, like Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory, which can derive AC0.
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5.3. Herbelin’s calculus for Markov Principle
In [22], Herbelin presented IQCMP, an intuitionistic predicate logic that can derive
the pure predicate-logical version of Markov’s Principle. Our MQC+ has been devel-
oped starting from his calculus. There are two important differences between the two.
First, derivations of IQCMP are annotated by a context of Σ-formulae, not just one
formula. This permits to have a derivation which uses multiple and different instances
of Markov’s Principle. Had we had context-annotations as well, it would have been
possible to have the following characterisation of provability of Σ-formulae S :
`+ S 3.3 // `i S ⊥
by def. of (·)⊥
oo 3.6 // `c S
MP `i S
OO
`i ¬¬Soo
Proving that such a context-annotated version of MQC+ satisfies the analogues of the
properties proven in Section 4 remains future work.
Aside from that, the typing and the reduction rules for delimited control operators
of IQCMP are a restriction of those for MQC+. Consider the typing rules:
Γ `α:T,∆ p : T Catch
Γ `∆ catchαp : T
Γ `∆ p : T (α : T ) ∈ ∆ Throw
Γ `∆ throwαp : A
While catch is just #, the proof term throw p is a particular case of Sk.p that does
not use the continuation variable k inside p, something already seen with the proof term
deriving MP of Example 2.7.
5.4. Other studies of delimited control operators
Delimited control operators have been studied in the Theoretical Computer Science
literature quite extensively in the past twenty years, since their appearance [35, 43, 12].
We mention some of the works that pertain to Logic.
The original typing system for shift/reset of Danvy and Filinski from [9] is a so-
called “type-and-effect” system: implication is a quaternary not a binary connective,
and is as such difficult to understand in traditional logical terms. A proof of Subject
Reduction, Progress, and Normalisation of this system appears in [2, 3].
A typing system which is a specialisation of Danvy and Filinski’s, but again has a
ternary implication connective, appears in [38].
Ariola, Herbelin and Sabry [1] decompose shift/reset in their own calculus and
prove, besides other things, the normalisation property for a typing system where reset
is applied at atomic types.
There are a number of works connecting delimited control operators to sub-structural
classical logic [26, 47, 37]. Our contribution differs in two respects: we identify de-
limited control operators as giving rise to an a priori constructive logic, rather than
classical logic which is only constructive a posteriori for certain classes of formulae;
and we are connecting delimited control operators with known extra-intuitionistic ax-
ioms, rather than analysing the sub-structural properties of the derivation system rules
themselves.
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5.5. The meaning of DNS in the presence of common axioms
In this paper we were dealing with a purely predicate-logical version of DNS. Fur-
ther examination is necessary on how DNS interacts with common logical axioms,
as Wim Veldman kindly warned us. For instance, DNS is false in some uncountable
models: for example, it contradicts the continuity principle proposed by Brouwer.
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